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raphy and, conversely, what would society lose if it banned "sheer 
pornography," which is, after all, most pornography? The standard 
answers are that all expressions do, or at least may, contain some-
thing of value, and that the loss sustained in any restriction of free-
dom of expression is always greater than the gain. But why should 
we believe that? 
Of course, these questions do not answer themselves; they are 
proposed here only as worth discussing seriously. Indeed, they 
must be discussed if we are to make sense of our constitutional free-
dom of speech. Downs seems to be aware of them, even though in 
the end he retreats into a slightly modified orthodox liberalism. But 
his book will have served a purpose if it helps to crack the shell of 
liberal denial that pornography is in any sense a problem, and 
makes it possible once again to face the questions that it raises. 
MARBURY v. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. By 
Robert Lowry Clinton. I Lawrence, Kan.: University of Kan-
sas Press. 1989. Pp. xii, 332. $35.00 cloth. 
Kent Newmyer2 
Marbury v. Madison has always been the centerpiece in the his-
tory of judicial review. Its precise significance has, of course, been 
controversial. Some scholars, downplaying the originality of Mar-
shall's opinion, argue that the Court simply spelled out the logic of 
the Constitution itself. Others contend-some approvingly, others 
disapprovingly-that the Chief Justice went far beyond what the 
framers intended and essentially created judicial review. A few see 
the decision as almost entirely political-a shootout for power be-
tween Federalists and Jeffersonians as represented by those implaca-
ble enemies, Marshall and Jefferson. Even those scholars who leave 
some law in Marshall's opinion often emphasize the deft political 
maneuvering which got the Chief Justice to the legal position he 
wanted to reach. But whether the opinion is seen as declaratory of 
constitutional intent, or usurpatory, or somewhere in between, 
traditional scholarship recognizes Marbury as the special moment 
in the development of judicial power. 
Professor Robert Clinton challenges this fundamental proposi-
tion head on. Reading Marshall's opinion in light of contemporary 
canons of interpretation, derived from English common law as well 
l. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Southern Illinois University. 
2. Professor of History, University of Connecticut. 
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as colonial and early state practice, he concludes that Marbury was 
not meant to, and did not, establish a broad doctrine of judicial 
review. The sweeping modem concept of judicial authority, argues 
Clinton, appeared only in the late nineteenth century as the justifi-
cation for the activist role assumed by the Supreme Court under 
Fuller and Waite in protecting corporate property rights. As part 
of this same ideology, the broad interpretation of Marbury gained 
acceptance. This mistaken interpretation has been accepted uncriti-
cally by twentieth century scholars and given credence by the large 
role assumed by the modem Court-in both its conservative and its 
liberal moments. 
If Professor Clinton is correct, much that has been written 
about Marbury and judicial review (and about John Marshall him-
self) needs revision. While it may be too soon to tear up your dog-
eared lecture notes, Clinton's highly intelligent, sharply reasoned 
argument makes a strong case for some hard rethinking of tradi-
tional assumptions. The Court did for the first time void a congres-
sional act, to be sure, and did decla~e in the case at hand that the 
executive branch was bound by the law of the land. But what Mar-
shall did not say, we are reminded, is as important as what he did 
say. He did not put forth the Court as the sole interpreter of the 
Constitution or maintain that its word was definitive and binding on 
the coordinate branches. Instead, says Clinton, Marbury focused 
on the Court's own duties under the Constitution-which were im-
portant but far from the broad supervisory function generally at-
tributed to the decision. Others have touched on this point, but 
Clinton goes beyond them to argue that this constricted version of 
judicial review was not judicial double-speak or part of some devi-
ous political strategy but rather followed the commonly accepted 
interpretive canon of the age, embodied in the English common law 
as transmitted to America by Blackstone's Commentaries. This 
interpretive principle, which did not distinguish statutory from 
constitutional construction, held that courts may void legislative 
acts only when to enforce them would introduce into the court's 
ruling "absurd consequences, manifestly contradictory to common 
reason."3 
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove beyond question 
that Blackstone's view of the matter was accepted universally in 
America, though his Commentaries were admittedly the main 
source of common law learning in the new republic. Clinton does 
show, however, that the state judicial review cases which predated 
the Constitution and influenced the framers' position on the judicial 
3. W. BLACKSTONE Tenth Rule of Construction in COMMENTARIES. 
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branch were consistent with the Blackstonian position. Nothing in 
the debates at the convention nor in the Constitution itself nor in 
The Federalist is inconsistent with it. And the Court in Marbury 
did confront a contradiction which demanded resolution. By con-
flating jurisdiction with remedy, Marbury's standing was made to 
rest on an exceptionally expansive reading of section 13, whereas 
original jurisdiction in article III was limited, for good reason, to 
ambassadorial officials ("ambassadors, other public ministers, and 
consuls"). In choosing article III over section 13, the Court fol-
lowed article VI, which made the Constitution the supreme law of 
the land. The Court did not presume to repeal section 13, which 
remained in effect except in cases like Marbury. Put simply, Clin-
ton accepts Marshall's description of what the Court did and why. 
If, said the Chief Justice, "both the law and the constitution apply 
to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case 
conformably to law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably 
to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine 
which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very 
essence of judicial duty. "4 This concept of the judicial role, main-
tains Clinton, was what contemporaries-following colonial prac-
tice, state precedent and Blackstone-agreed it should be. 
By taking Marshall at his word, Clinton introduces the re-
markable notion that the Court actually said what it meant and 
meant what it said. His reading of Marbury is as heretical as it is 
simple, and it is attractive because it explains aspects of the decision 
that traditional accounts gloss over. For example, Clinton's reading 
makes it unnecessary to attribute to Marshall ideas that he did not 
express in the opinion. It comports with the fact that there was 
very little contemporary criticism (or even notice) of the Court's 
ruling on section 13. Here Clinton confronts John Bannister Gib-
son's dissent in Eakin v. Raub (1825), which he argues convincingly 
is a much overrated critique of judicial review, one which in any 
case did not mention Marbury and may even in fact have been in 
general accordance with it. Clinton's argument also accounts for 
Marbury not being cited by the antebellum Court as authority for 
judicial review, and more importantly helps explain the Court's un-
usual deference to acts of Congress until Dred Scott (1857). 
Without undertaking to describe all the nuances of Clinton's 
analysis, let me say simply that his argument that Marbury has been 
overrated and misunderstood has much to recommend it. But does 
it follow, as Clinton claims, that a broad tradition of judicial gov-
ernance did not exist before the 1870s? A minimalist Marbury, I 
4. S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1801). 
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submit, doesn't mean a minimalist Court. Without rehearsing the 
constitutional history of the antebellum period, let me suggest sev-
eral reasons for concluding that even without an expansive Mar-
bury, a remarkably broad role for the Supreme Court was 
established during this period. First, it should be noted that limit-
ing the Court's ruling to the parties in the case (which Clinton 
claims Marshall did in Marbury and which Jefferson said he should 
do in all cases) is not such a great curtailment of judicial authority 
as Clinton supposes. Congress and the president may not be 
obliged to accept the constitutional interpretations of the Court, but 
as long as parties bring disputes to it, the Court will have the last 
word and that word is law in any meaningful sense of the word. 
More importantly, consider the impact of judicial review of 
state law on general notions of judicial power. Clinton is well aware 
of the distinction between judicial review over the coordinate 
branches and judicial review of state law. But the difference may 
have been less important in the perception of contemporaries than it 
is in the refined analysis of modem legal scholars. Holmes among 
others was right when he noted many years ago that the federal 
review of state law was the great issue of antebellum constitutional 
history-the one on which the Court cut its institutional teeth. 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816) and Cohen v. Virginia (1821), for 
example, were probably as important as Marbury in shaping the 
Court's powers-not to mention the course of history. And those 
cases called forth bold statements of judicial authority. Consider 
especially Story's statement in Martin upholding the constitutional-
ity of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Not only did Con-
gress have the power to pass the law, declared Story, it was obliged 
to do so. This aggressive, not to say arrogant, act of constitutional 
exegesis had Marshall's full approval, down to the last word.s 
One is reminded by Story's ruling in Martin that the Court's 
claim to power was made during this period chiefly in cases uphold-
ing congressional acts. Which brings us to McCulloch v. Maryland, 
arguably the great case of judicial review that Marbury is not. Clin-
ton mentions McCulloch only to note that the Court deferred to 
congressional authority, which of course it did by upholding the 
congressional act chartering the Bank. But it is hard to read the 
Chief Justice's olympian exposition of the framers' intent (especially 
in conjunction with his anonymous essays in defense of his opinion 
in the newspapers) without concluding that he believed the Court 
5. For a discussion of Story's opinion in Manin, see R. NEWMYER, SUPREME CoURT 
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 106-14 (1985). 
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had a special pipeline to constitutional truth. 6 Indeed, he declared 
explicitly, as he had not in Marbury, that acts of Congress in viola-
tion of the Constitution would be struck down by the Court. 1 
Whatever he may have intended in Marbury, in McCulloch Mar-
shall did not limit this power to statutes dealing with the judiciary. 
Southern reaction to Martin, Cohens, and especially McCulloch 
indicates clearly that the Court had laid claim to extraordinary 
powers of governance. Such was the view, for example, of Thomas 
Jefferson, Spencer Roane, John Taylor of Caroline County, John 
Randolph of Roanoke, Beverly and St. George Tucker, and ulti-
mately John C. Calhoun. Even some of the Court's fiercest crit-
ics-for example, Spencer Roane after McCulloch-agreed with 
Marshall that the Court could invalidate unconstitutional acts of 
Congress, regardless of whether those acts pertained to the judicial 
function as in Marbury. Indeed, the massive anti-court movement 
of the 1820s is unmistakable evidence that the Supreme Court was 
well along in consolidating itself as a force in American govern-
ment. Joseph Story put the case in the broadest possible terms 
when he answered Calhoun's attack on judicial review in his Com-
mentaries on the Constitution (1833). His defense rested not just on 
Marbury, but on a composite of the major decisions ofthe Marshall 
Court and its predecessors. s Story was right: when it comes to de-
fining the nature of judicial authority, the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts and certainly greater than any one part, even Mar-
bury. When, in 1857, the President and Congress looked to the 
Supreme Court, in the pending Dred Scott case, for a definitive 
statement on the constitutional meaning of slavery in the territories, 
and when the Taney Court pridefully acceded to their wishes, they 
took for granted a degree of judicial authority that had moved far 
beyond the arguably narrow Blackstonian notion of judicial review 
set forth in Marbury. American constitutional law had become, as 
Daniel Webster put it, an "American question." 
This line of criticism, however, does not detract from the value 
of Clinton's reinterpretation of Marbury, and his fine description of 
how Marbury was misinterpreted in the late nineteenth century to 
justify judicial activism. Judicial review, as Carl Brent Swisher 
noted many years ago, did take on a new meaning in this period. 
Clinton clearly demonstrates that Marbury myth-makers played an 
important role in this transformation. 
6. Marshall's essays are reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH V. 
MARYLAND (G. Gunther ed. 1969). 
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819). 
8. R. NEWMYER, STORY 190-92. 
